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El Farol Revisited: A Note on Emergence, Game Theory and Society 
 
 
Some years ago Brian (Arthur 1994) published a seminal article on the problem of 
resolving the crowding conditions at his favorite local bar El Farol, in Santa Fe. The informal 
setting and its seating problems provided a striking metaphor for a basic coordination problem 
that occurs in many contexts.  Arthur provided an imaginative and deep solution to an every day 
minor problem.  
   A simple version is as follows: Say 100 people like to go to listen to the music, but all 
dislike overcrowding. They all have the same taste that indicates that they enjoy attending if there 
are 60 or fewer individuals, but would prefer to stay away if there is a higher number than 60 in 
attendance.  Each individual has a large set of rules of thumb that he or she utilizes. The rules are 
of the variety such as do not go the bar if last time there were over 60 present; or go if the you 
think the trend 81, 71, 62 will continue.  As long as an individual’s rule of thumb works he stays 
with it, when it fails another rule is tried. Arthur’s simulations showed that the mean attendance 
was around 60 although the numbers were in constant fluctuation. 
This article together with other articles such as a stock market simulation (Arthur et al., 
1995) helped to launch an important evolutionary approach to emerging norms of human 
behavior. 
   A reasonable question to ask is: “does conventional non-cooperative game theory also 
have a satisfactory answer to the bar attendance problem? I suggest that it does not.  Formally, 
with common knowledge there exists a mixed strategy non-cooperative equilibrium (NCE) where 
each individual randomizes between going and not going on a 60:40 basis. This gives the same 
mean as the evolutionary approach but the mechanism of 100 independent simultaneous 
randomizations, while feasible, is an unsatisfactory positive description of human behavior. 
There is no learning or any reaction to the information gleaned from experience. It might fit 100 
well trained students of noncooperative game theory who have been trained that a non-
cooperative equilibrium solution is not only descriptive, but normative, even though it appears to 
be neither.  
   John Nash commented in discussing his differences with the von Neumann stress on 
cooperative game solutions for other than two person constant sum games, that von Neumann 
was a European and that John’s solution reflected a more natural American way.
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  In contrast with either static cooperative or noncooperative game theory, Arthur’s agents, 
for better or worse, are reacting to every experience at the bar and coming out with a solution 
with the same expectation as the noncooperative game mixed strategy equilibrium. The El Farol 
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  Personal discussion when we were graduate students after I had noted that von Neumann in a personal 
discussion on the train from New York to Princeton indicated that he was not satisfied with either the non-
cooperative equilibrium of Nash or the value solution of Shapley because they were too specific for the 
level of abstraction provided by the game theoretic models. He felt that at best a static equilibrium theory 
would delineate a set of outcomes. I suggested that the Shapley value provided a valuable benchmark, but 




bar problem is a coordination problem of central concern to the social sciences.  Is there any 
room for a different solution?  In all of such problems context matters and initial conditions 
matter.  I suggest that context matters to the extent that the nature of the context will signal as to 
whether a higher order organization is required than that indicated by the bar problem.  
 There are many activities in human society for which the bar problem appears to be an 
extremely natural solution. These include much of consumer activities such as shopping in 
general, betting or the horses, or baseball, playing the stock market and indulging in low 
objective information voting. A pleasant time at El Farol requires much less than explicitly 
cooperative behavior.  Rule enforcement and the often high resource costs of the coordinating 
and enforcing mechanism are not called for.   
  The solution for the El Farol problem is as Arthur suggested.  The context is a small bar 
with an Irish music night. The initial conditions can best be described as a randomly picked day 
in the life of an ongoing establishment.  The fluctuations in patronage were “good enough” at the 
time that they did not call for El Farol to try to create a higher level organization. The aggregate 
behavior of the individuals provides a sufficient signal as to whether a higher level of 
coordinating device is required. 
  Except under situations of heavy flux, rule of thumb selections appear to work well 
enough in situations such as the El Farol or the stock market, each producing a viable 
evolutionary dynamics. When there are events such as a major bubble, the soup of individual 
rules does not always appear to be sufficient to produce viable coordination. It is then that the 
individuals acting as a society and polity will deem it desirable to devise the appropriate rules to 
bound the activities and pay for  the physical resources and bureaucracy needed to keep the 
aggregated individual activity within bounds.  
  There are many other situations in society where the cost of the rules bounding the 
process appears almost immediately. The rules of the road and the control of nuclear weapons 
supply two examples.  Before discussing them, two comments that are highly relevant are noted. 
One is from experimental gaming and the other is from biology.  
  The first comment was made soon after my first serious interest in experimental gaming.  
This came in 1955 when I met Sidney Siegel, a fine experimental psychologist. I started to work 
with him in 1956 and through him became interested in the possibilities of joint work in 
economics and psychology.  In connection with experimental gaming I met John Kennedy, then 
chair of the psychology department at Princeton. At one point in our discussion when I was 
sketching out a fairly crude market game, Kennedy said: Tell me the result you want and give me 
control of the briefing and I will get you the result you want
2
 
In subsequent years when I became interested in business gaming and war gaming as well 
as experimental gaming  I began to appreciate the critical role of the pre-game briefing and its 
relationship to setting the context and providing considerable cues and possibly dangerous biases 
to the players. 
  Much of economic experimental gaming is rigid rule gaming; a great deal of war gaming 
is free form gaming that may be assisted by small formal model packages to calculate items such 
as expected damages after an airstrike. From the viewpoint of game theory rigid rule gaming 
obeys the modeling conditions that all of the rules of the game are formalized and are common 
knowledge. Even there a verbal or written briefing is usually given to the players to set context.  
In contrast, free form gaming (such as the PME or politico-military exercise) does not have all of 
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 I have left off the quotes as I did not write down the wording precisely at the time, but that was the gist of 
the comment. 
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the rules given at the beginning of the game. A detailed context is provided by the control.  
During the game the teams may challenge the refereeing group arguing for a change to other 
rules as being more reasonable than the current rules. The second type of game is explicitly 
evolutionary and new knowledge-seeking. The first is implicitly more analytically oriented and 
rigid. 
  The second comment I wish to note comes directly from the research work in biology of 
Leo Buss (1987, page viii). He states: “At the heart of my argument is the simple observation that 
the history of life is a history of the elaboration of new self-replicating entities by the self-
replicating entities contained within them (or the incorporation of some self-replicating entities 
by others). 
  Analogy is often a dangerous tool.  It is reasonably clear to many of us to talk about a self 
reproducing cell or human, it is less clear to talk about a self-replicating nation state. Perhaps the 
closest description is that it is a self- renewing entity.  Richard Ruggles who specialized in 
national statistics, in order to illustrate definitional problems in statistics used to illustrate them 
with the story: “This old axe has been in the family for 100 years and is still as good as new. It 
has had seven new handles and five new heads but still works fine”.  
Many human affairs are best considered as a “game within the game” or for those who 
dislike the game analogy, they may be considered as a behavioral process embedded within a set 
of rules where the rules are provided by a higher and somewhat more conscious or rule based 
reactive agency. The agents, be they the customers at the bar, the automobile drivers on the road, 
or the formal and informal activists for nuclear inspection are involved with problems at different 
levels of complexity and  will have a different need to pay for a coordinating device. 
Many societies have had a legislature and judiciary for some time. All living organisms 
are to some extent environment setters, and humans, possibly more than others including social 
insects such as ants or bees devote much of their time consciously changing their environment.   
Over the last few decades there has been a considerable growth in evolutionary game 
theory where the intentional randomization by optimizing agents present in formal game theory 
is reinterpreted as a statistic over a collection of simple hardwired organisms.  It appears that this 
development of game theory is best suited to cells or insects rather than higher order animals or 
humans. The Arthur solution fits neither evolutionary game theory nor noncooperative game 
theory.  Where does it fit? It offers an insight to the solution of a large class of everyday 
problems in an organized mass society.  These include problems where noncorrelated 
nonstrategic, low information behavior does not yield considerably less than explicitly strategic 
behavior, given that the environment including the institutions of the society needed to permit 
that form of behavior are extant and  provide sufficient enforcement to limit the individual 
behavior to a set of alternatives easily handled by his or her rules of motion. 
Let us contrast the bar problem, with the “side of the road driving problem”. A rough 
glance at Google
3
 indicates that 66% of the world’s population live in countries that drive on the 
right and 34% live in countries that drive on the left. The predominant change has been from left 
to right. A suggestion has been made as to why the left was chosen by England in the Middle 
Ages. If a stranger passed by on the right an individual’s sword hand was at the ready if there 
were trouble to be faced. There are many casual stories, but they all have a single punch line: a 
convention was adopted.  It differed from country to country, but in each instance it was deemed 
to be worth while and was obeyed. 
 




The advent of the automobile forced societies to formulate the rules of the road formally 
and consciously and to spend resources on institutions designed to enforce them. The radical 
change in environment required a higher level of organization for survival to be supplied fairly 
quickly. 
  There is a large and basically normative literature in cooperative game theory where an 
underlying basic axiom is that a solution should be efficient, however in the modeling, often the 
cost of attaining the efficiency is not made explicit
4
. I suggest that the switch to a higher level of 
organization is invariably associated with a new resource allocation where the resource costs fall 
on the more primitive organisms. Good economics, biology and ecology call for an 
understanding of the reallocation of resources between the lower and higher order systems. The 
evolution of cooperation has been studied considerably by randomly matched pairs so popular in 
mathematical economics. Getting the political deal done, keeping the bureaucracy honest and 
efficient, following the axioms of Las Vegas and New York, leaving a little on the table for the 
dealer or making sure that Murphy has had his drink, all call for handling a heterogeneity of 
purpose and complexity leading to the emergence of higher order self renewing systems. This is 
not yet captured in either the formal mathematical or the agent based models. 
It is not axiomatic that when the environment becomes more complex that the organisms 
can necessarily adjust, even though failure may challenge survival. The third example selected is 
universal nuclear inspection. A viable supra-national organization with sufficient enforcement 
abilities does not yet exist. It is needed. Can the current nation states produce such an institution? 
It is not obvious. A call for universal inspection is a call for another layer of complexity. The 
leaders of some nation state such as China, the United States or Russia have to propose a system 
in which that state itself invites inspection.  
This paper began with the story of El Farol and noted the Santa Fe Institute stock market. 
It ends somewhat gloomily with questions concerning the need for more complex institutions to 
provide the guidance that is not explicitly signaled by the agents at El Farol.  Each layer of 
complexity appears to change the timing of the processes. 
These comments are not a negative critique of the fundamental originality presented in 
Arthur’s work; on the contrary his work offered a macro-dynamics for the amount of 
coordination and choreography that can arise from the individuals viewed as cells within a social 
body. They set us up for the next steps in having the higher order institutions for human 
coordination and governance emerge. This development must provide for an emergence of higher 
organisms that steer between the simplistic idiocy and fantasy of a Rousseau and the pragmatic 
pessimism of a Hobbes. 
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 Although Shapley and I have discussed the “correction” of the characteristic function used to represent a 
game in coalitional form with an  ε or εs charge to all coalitions of sizes  to reflect organization costs. 
